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 As information technology becomes integral to the products and services in a growing range of industries, there
 has been a corresponding surge of interest in understanding how firms can effectively formulate and execute
 digital business strategies. This fusion of IT within the business environment gives rise to a strategic tension
 between investing in digital artifacts for long-term value creation and exploiting them for short-term value ap-
 propriation. Further , relentless innovation and competitive pressures dictate that firms continually adapt these
 artifacts to changing market and technological conditions , but sustained profitability requires scalable archi-
 tectures that can serve a large customer base and stable interfaces that support integration across a diverse
 ecosystem of complementary offerings. The study of digital business strategy needs new concepts and methods
 to examine how these forces are managed in pursuit of competitive advantage. We conceptualize the logic of
 digital business strategy in terms of two constructs: design capital (i.e., the cumulative stock of designs owned
 or controlled by a firm) and design moves (i.e., the discrete strategic actions that enlarge, reduce, or modify
 a firm 's stock of designs). We also identify two salient dimensions of design capital, namely, option value and
 technical debt. Using embedded case studies of four firms, we develop a rich conceptual model and testable
 propositions to lay out a design-based logic of digital business strategy. This logic highlights the interplay be-
 tween design moves and design capital in the context of digital business strategy and contributes to a growing
 body of insights that link the design of digital artifacts to competitive strategy and firm-level performance.
 Keywords: Design capital, design moves, digital options, technical debt, IT architecture
 1 Anandhi Bharadwaj, Omar A. El Sawy, Paul A. Pavlou, and N. Venkatraman served as the senior editors for this special issue and were responsible for accepting
 this paper.
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 Introduction
 Advances in the functionality of information technologies and
 transformations in the way they are being fused with products,
 services, and business processes are challenging conventional
 wisdom about the design and execution of competitive stra-
 tegy. Three distinct types of logic have guided the prevailing
 managerial insights. The logic of positioning argues that
 managers should choose a profitable position in their industry
 and execute their firm's competitive strategy through cost
 leadership, differentiation, or market segmentation (Porter
 1980). Within a chosen position, this logic recommends that
 firms align their activities and value chains for superior
 execution and delivery of a compelling value proposition to
 customers (Porter 2001). The classic conceptual arguments
 for the strategic role of IT in activities such as pricing (Beath
 and Ives 1986) and customer relationship management (Ives
 and Learmonth 1 984; Porter and Millar 1 985) reflect the logic
 of positioning. In contrast, the logic of leverage argues that
 firms can sustain their competitive advantage through the
 possession of rare, valuable, and inimitable resources and
 capabilities (Barney 1991); managers should therefore direct
 their attention toward resource-picking and capability-
 building processes as mechanisms for executing an effective
 competitive strategy (Makadok 2001). Information systems
 researchers have examined the complementarities between IT
 and business capabilities and resources (Melville et al. 2004)
 to establish mechanisms by which investments in IT could
 catalyze the development of business capabilities and
 measurably impact firm performance (e.g., Banker et al. 2006;
 Mithas et al. 2011; Ray et al. 2005). Finally, the logic of
 opportunism argues that managers must devote their attention
 to continuous innovation and competitive maneuvering in
 order to achieve sustained profitability (D' Aveni et al. 2010).
 According to this logic, competitive advantages are fleeting;
 therefore, successful firms must play the role of arbitrageurs,
 detecting windows of opportunity and executing competitive
 actions to seize them (Helfat and Raubitschek 2000). The
 role of IT in facilitating these competitive actions has been
 examined in prior conceptual developments (e.g., Piccoli and
 Ives 2005; Sambamurthy et al. 2003) and recent empirical
 studies (e.g., Lu and Ramamurthy 201 1 ; Pavlou and El Sawy
 2010).
 While the need to align IT and business strategy has been a
 dominant theme in this work, El Sawy (2003) makes the case
 for a new perspective, which he terms "the fusion view of IS,"
 that sees information systems as embedded in, and integral to,
 the product and service offerings of the firm. The emergence
 of new business models (Osterwalder and Pigneur 2010) and
 the transformation of entire industries by IT (Dhar and 2007)
 are prompting calls for a new logic of competitive strategy
 that recognizes the fused nature of IT and its central role in
 product development and service delivery. Observations of
 the competitive conduct of prominent technology firms such
 as Google, Apple, and Microsoft (e.g., Cusumano 2010) - as
 well as firms in industries that are undergoing strategic trans-
 formations such as financial services, hospitality, and enter-
 t inment - suggest that additional insights are needed to
 explain and predict strategic behavior in fused environments.
 In this context, we define a digital business strategy as a
 pattern of deliberate competitive actions undertaken by a firm
 as it competes by offering digitally enabled products or
 services. Although the logic of positioning, leverage, and
 opportunism continue to provide a robust umbrella for gener-
 ating insights about competitive strategy, recent conceptual
 frameworks, such as the digital ecodynamics perspective (El
 Sawy et al. 2010) and the complex adaptive business systems
 p rspective (Tanriverdi et al. 2010), have begun to draw
 attention to the ways in which the logic of digital business
 strategy might be distinctive. In the same spirit, Yoo et al.
 (2010) call for a deeper examination of the logic of digital
 business strategy when they state:
 IS scholars need to question and complement their
 received models of aligning IT to business strategy,
 identifying core IT resources, and managing IT as a
 standardized commodity.... We need new strategic
 frameworks that are aimed at deliberately harnessing
 the unique capabilities of digital technology that are
 embedded into products to gain competitive advan-
 tage (p. 730).
 They argue that digital innovation - the process of leveraging
 digital artifacts to transform existing physical products or
 create new ones - offers a powerful lens for developing such
 frameworks. The concept of digital innovation draws atten-
 tion to the ways in which firms recombine, reconfigure, or
 design new digital artifacts in response to competitors' actions
 or windows of market opportunity.
 Yoo et al. highlight the special importance of layered modular
 architectures in shaping digital innovation. These architec-
 tures coevolve with the governance choices of their stake-
 holders and are influenced by forces of technological and
 market turbulence beyond their control (Tiwana et al. 2010).
 On one hand, they must remain flexible and allow rapid
 adaptation to changes in technology and consumer prefer-
 ences (El Sawy et al. 2010; Tanriverdi et al. 2010). On the
 other hand, they must achieve sufficient scale and stability to
 allow firms to extract economic rents from a large customer
 base over an extended period of time (Adner and Kapoor
 2010; Boudreau 2010; West 2003). Moreover, the success of
 architectures that are championed by a single firm such as
 Apple or Google, or a small number of firms in partnership
 538 MIS Quarterly Vol. 37 No. 2/June 2013
 Woodard et al. /Design Capital and Design Moves
 such as Microsoft and Intel, often depends on the voluntary
 participation of other firms to create a vibrant ecosystem of
 complementary and competing offerings (Iansiti and Levien
 2004). These firms must strike a balance between investing
 in an architecture for long-term value creation and exploiting
 it for short-term value appropriation.
 Recent anecdotes about the success and failure of digital
 products and services testify to the strategic salience of this
 dilemma. For example, the initial success and eventual
 downfall of My space have been attributed in part to its early
 choice of an easy-to-use but "simplistic" software develop-
 ment platform, which limited its ability to sustain growth in
 the face of competitive pressure from Facebook (Gillette
 2011). In the mobile device industry, architectural bottle-
 necks in the incumbent platforms of RIM (BlackBerry) and
 Nokia (Symbian) hampered their ability to compete with
 newer entrants such as Apple's iOS and Google's Android
 (ben- Aaron 2011, Blandford 2011; Mace 2010). In an
 extreme case, HP's TouchPad tablet was withdrawn from the
 market after only seven weeks. Members of the development
 team conceded that the product's core software, WebOS,
 suffered from architectural flaws that may have doomed the
 effort from the start (Chen 2012).
 The goal of our research is to expand the emerging theoretical
 understanding about the way firms formulate and execute
 digital business strategies. Specifically, we study the design-
 based competitive actions through which firms develop new
 digital artifacts, transform their digital architectures over time,
 and influence their competitive environments. We draw upon
 the rich and growing literature on strategic product and
 system design (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Garud et al. 2003;
 LaMantia et al. 2008) and the dynamics of competitive
 actions (Smith et al. 2001), as well as case studies of four
 digital businesses. Our emergent theory connects the design
 decisions of firms to their role in influencing higher-level
 strategic capabilities. In the next section, we present our
 conceptual model and key constructs. After describing our
 empirical methodology we present our case data. We proceed
 to synthesize our case findings into a set of testable propo-
 sitions, and then discuss the implications of our approach for
 developing a research program on digital business strategy.
 Conceptual Development
 The Locus of Digital Business Strategy:
 Design Capital and Design Moves
 We conceptualize the logic of digital business strategy in
 terms of two key constructs: design capital and design
 moves. We define design capital as the cumulative stock of
 designs owned or controlled by a firm. In the context of
 digital business strategy, the most important elements of a
 firm's design capital are typically designs for digital artifacts,
 such as software components and their associated interfaces
 and data structures. These designs are sometimes collectively
 called the firm's digital architecture.2 While some of these
 designs might have a direct financial value (e.g., a patented
 algorithm or a copyrighted user interface), the strategic value
 of a firm's design capital lies mainly in the fact that it enables
 the firm to innovate through new and improved designs.
 Design moves are discrete strategic actions that enlarge,
 reduce, or modify a firm's stock of designs - for example,
 developing a new product or service, improving an existing
 component in a layered modular architecture, or reconfiguring
 the architecture itself (Henderson and Clark 1990). The state
 of a firm's design capital both enables and constrains the
 design moves available to the firm at a given time.
 Design Capital as a Digital Options Platform
 Like other kinds of capital stocks (e.g., property, plant, and
 equipment), design capital is an economic factor of produc-
 tion. Unlike physical goods, designs are information goods
 and thus intrinsically non-rival (i.e., a firm can license or give
 away its designs without losing them). Moreover, the value
 of design capital may be highly firm-specific, since a par-
 ticular set of designs might require complementary assets or
 capabilities to monetize them successfully (Teece 1986).
 Hence, design capital can be a source of competitive
 advantage - or disadvantage - similar to other firm-specific
 resources. In addition to designs for customer-facing system
 components (e.g., user interfaces) and architectural design
 elements (e.g., programming interfaces or design rules), de-
 sign capital encompasses internal systems and processes that
 enable business capabilities (e.g., the ability to stream content,
 manage identity information, or transact payments securely).
 Designs for digital artifacts can be highly complex, making it
 difficult to characterize a firm's design capital in a parsi-
 monious way. Building on the prior literature on modular
 designs (Baldwin and Clark ¿000) and an emerging literature
 in software engineering (Brown et al. 2010), we focus on two
 key dimensions that directly enable or constrain the
 competitive actions taken by firms in executing a digital
 business strategy: option value and technical debt .
 2Our definition of design capital extends prior conceptualizations such as
 digitized process capital and knowledge capital (Sambamurthy et al. 2003),
 and embraces the concept of a layered modular architecture, which is central
 to digital innovation activities that fuse various components of a digital
 product or service offering such as content, network, devices, operating
 systems, user interfaces, and data (Yoo et al. 2010).
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 Baldwin and Clark (2006) argue that "new designs are funda-
 mentally options with associated economic option value " (p.
 181). The option value of a design reflects both the value of
 the products or services in which it is directly realized (which
 may be uncertain during the design process) and the value of
 the alternative designs that it makes possible (which might
 include variations or subsequent improvements on the initial
 design). Option value is closely related to the concept of
 generativity, defined by Zittrain (2006) as "a technology's
 overall capacity to produce unprompted change, driven by
 large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences" (p. 1980). Yoo
 et al. (2010) propose that "generativity in a layered modular
 architecture is accomplished through loose couplings across
 layers whereby innovations can spring up independently at
 any layer, leading to cascading effects on other layers" (p.
 728). At the firm level, option value is a measure of the
 breadth of opportunities afforded by the firm's design capital.
 Option value is enhanced by architectures that enable
 designers to combine components within or across layers,
 cultivate or attract external partners (e.g., by providing appli-
 cation programming interfaces or software development kits),
 and launch innovative digital offerings.
 Technical debt refers to the expected cost or effort entailed in
 exercising the options embedded in a firm's design capital
 (Baldwin and MacCormack 2011). Designers accumulate
 technical debt as systems evolve and create obligations that
 must be "repaid" in order to make changes to a system
 (Brown et al. 2010; Cunningham 1992). Such obligations
 could be associated with technical redesign, component
 upgrading, or wholesale replacement of an architecture or
 layer to implement a desired functionality. Software engi-
 neering research proposes that technical debt is a natural by-
 product of the design process and can be modeled using
 observed design decisions taken by the system designers
 (Sullivan et al. 1999; Sullivan et al. 2001). Technical debt is
 incurred for many reasons; while sometimes reckless or
 inadvertent, it may be prudent and deliberate (Fowler 2009).
 In particular, shortages of resources, time, or talent frequently
 lead designers intentionally to optimize for short-term goals
 at the expense of making a product or system easy to maintain
 and evolve. According to Brown et al. (2010, p. 47), "Like
 financial debt, sometimes technical debt can be necessary.
 One can continue paying interest" in the form of increased
 costs of code maintenance and development, "or pay down
 the principal by re-architecting and refactoring to reduce
 future interest payments." Recent software engineering
 studies have begun to quantify these costs empirically (e.g.,
 Guo and Seaman 201 1; Nugroho et al. 201 1).
 Baldwin and MacCormack (20 11) argue that option value and
 technical debt are akin to financial assets and liabilities, and
 define the net present value of a modular architecture as the
 difference between the two. While a mathematical analysis
 of these relationships is beyond the scope of our work, we
 propose the analogous idea that the value of a firm's design
 capital is enhanced in the presence of high option value and
 low technical debt, and diminished by the opposite. These
 two dimensions of design capital thus provide a way to reason
 about the ability of a digital business to exploit the oppor-
 tunities available to it.
 The Design Capital Map
 Figure 1 represents our two-dimensional conceptualization of
 design capital as a matrix of four different states. This matrix,
 or design capital map , provides an intuitive way to indicate
 the state of a firm's design capital at a point in time, and to
 illustrate the effects of design moves as transitions from one
 state to another.
 A typical new product life cycle begins in quadrant I, with a
 low level of technical debt, but few options. In this state,
 firms are constrained by the technical potential of their
 existing designs, but exploiting this potential is relatively easy
 due to the absence of "legacy" code or compatibility require-
 ments. In this option-constrained state, the limiting factor in
 enhancing the value of the firm's design capital is the lack of
 design options embedded in the current architecture. This
 could be remedied by continued investments in product devel-
 opment with the aim of expanding the firm's portfolio of
 design options. Conversely, quadrant III represents design
 capital with high technical debt and high option value. In this
 state, firms have a rich stock of designs with high potential for
 future development. However, their ability to exercise the
 options embedded in these designs is limited by the cost of
 retiring the technical debt that is attached to them. In such a
 debt-constrained state, significant investments may be needed
 to clean up a code base or address incompatibilities among
 existing modules before new development can proceed. Debt-
 constrained firms are often inhibited in their cycle time for
 new product releases or the ability to rapidly add functionality
 in response to market demand.
 Quadrant II describes a state of low-quality design capital
 characterized by low option value and high technical debt. In
 this state, firms suffer from the worst of both worlds because
 their designs afford few options to exploit market oppor-
 tunities, and even those options are of limited net value due to
 the high cost of exercising them. Finally, quadrant IV repre-
 sents a state of high-quality design capital characterized by
 high option value and low technical debt. Firms in this state
 enjoy the opportunity to seize a wide range of market oppor-
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 tunities and respond to their competitors' actions with speed
 and scale. These firms are typically well positioned to influ-
 ence their broader ecosystems by using architectural control
 as a source of competitive advantage (Woodard 2008).
 Design Moves and Their Dual Relationship
 to Design Capital
 Design moves are discrete strategic actions that change the
 structure or function of a digital artifact (product or system).
 "Discrete" means that each action can be identified separately
 from others and arranged in a temporal sequence or nested
 hierarchically as part of a larger design move. "Strategic"
 means that the actions are taken with the intent of obtaining
 competitive advantage. We focus on actions taken by firms,
 although one could also consider design moves by indi-
 viduals, governments, standards organizations, open-source
 communities, or other agents that engage in strategic design.
 The iterated application of design moves drives the evolution
 of individual designs and changes the stock of designs owned
 or controlled by a firm. Thus, design capital can be viewed as
 the cumulative result of design moves enacted over time.
 Our use of the design move as a unit of analysis is informed
 by the work of Pentland (1992), who developed the concept
 of an organizing move to explain the behavior of technical
 support specialists in responding to customer calls. His work
 built on Goffman's (1981) use of moves to analyze discourse
 in face-to-face interactions. These studies grappled with the
 need to reason about actions that are deeply embedded in a
 situational context whose boundaries are hard to define in
 advance, and whose effects both enable and constrain
 subsequent actions. We contend that these conditions appl
 equally to the design of complex artifacts, which are core to
 firms that engage in digital business strategy.3
 Just as characterizing design capital presents difficult theo-
 retical challenges, there could be many ways to describe and
 classify design moves. For conceptual parsimony, we charac-
 terize design moves based on their ffects on a firm's design
 capital, using the same two dimensions as the design c pital
 map (Figure 1). A design move can be represented as a
 vector on the map, indicatin  th  extent to which the move
 increases or decreases the ption value of a firm's desi ns and
 increases or decreases the firm's technical debt.
 3The concept of a move was also invoked by Donal  Schön (1983) in his
 eminal study on reflective practice.
 According to Schön, designing proceeds as "a reflective conver-
 sation with the situation," an interactive process based on posing
 a problem frame by frame and exploring its implications in
 "moves" that investigate the arising solution possibilities. A
 design r, he argued, is faced with a situation of complexity.
 "Because of this complexity, the designer's moves tend, happily
 or unhappily, to produce consequences other than those intended.
 When this happens, the designer may take into account of the
 unintended changes he has made in the situation by forming new
 appreciations and understandings and by making new moves"
 (Cross 2011, p. 23).
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 To increase option value, a design move must either create
 new design options or increase the value of existing options.
 We define a design option as the right but not the obligation
 to make a design move in the future. Modularity multiplies
 design options because it allows multiple design experiments
 to be executed in parallel, each of which may be evaluated
 independently (Baldwin and Clark 2000). Design moves that
 change the architecture of a modular system are of special
 strategic significance because they can reshape both short-
 term opportunities for capturing economic value and the
 system's long-term path of design evolution (Baldwin and
 Clark 1997; Garud and Kumaj-aswamy 1995; Morris and
 Ferguson 1993).
 Although it may seem counterintuitive that a firm would
 voluntarily reduce the option value of its design capital,
 product and system designers frequently encounter costs
 associated with keeping one's options open. For example,
 consider the additional effort involved in designing a
 graphical user interface to support multiple languages. At
 minimum, text strings need to be externalized (i.e., separated
 from the code); full international support requires a way to
 handle both multi-byte characters (e.g., for Chinese) and bi-
 directional text (e.g., for Arabic). One could imagine an
 ambitious programmer designing these features into a new
 product from the start, but if it turned out that most of the
 product's initial sales were in regions where externalized
 strings were sufficient, it might save time and confer
 competitive advantage (e.g., through speed to market) to forgo
 multi-byte and bi-directional support in subsequent versions.
 The same example can be used to illustrate the relationship
 between design moves and technical debt. Consider, as an
 alternative to dropping full international language support, the
 possibility of simply "hard-coding" English icons and menus
 for a new feature that is slated to be released in an upcoming
 version of the product targeted exclusively at the U.S. market.
 Making this design move would not require abandoning the
 option to support additional languages in the future (since the
 existing internationalization code would not be removed), but
 it would raise the cost of doing so because additional effort
 would be required to undo the hard-coding and reimplement
 the icons and menus properly. This contingent cost is the
 technical debt that would be created by the move. The
 additional effort to undo the hard-coding (perhaps negligible,
 but larger if the original programmer has left the firm) is
 analogous to interest on the debt. Just as firms and consumers
 rationally take on financial debt when they face short-term
 constraints or opportunities to leverage their investments,
 designers face situations in which design moves that increase
 technical debt are perfectly appropriate. Eventually, however,
 the debt must be retired, or design evolution will grind to a
 halt. This can be achieved either through debt-reducing
 design moves or moves that reduce option value by aban-
 doning options to which debt is attached.
 The Dynamics of Design Moves
 As a given design move increases or decreases option value
 and/or technical debt, it may shift a firm's design capital from
 one to another of the states shown in Figure 1 . For example,
 consider a firm with low-quality design capital (quadrant II).
 If the firm's designers make debt-reducing design moves, the
 firm might transition upward to the option-constrained state
 (quadrant I). Alternatively, an option-creating move would
 shift the firm's position to the right, toward the debt-
 constrained state (quadrant III). A complex design move that
 simultaneously reduces debt and creates new options would
 help the firm move toward the high-quality state (quadrant
 IV).
 Our conceptual model proposes that digital businesses enact
 design moves with the goal of managing the levels of option
 value and technical debt associated with the firm's design
 capital. At the same time, consistent with the conceptuali-
 zations of moves by Pentland and by Goffman, a firm's
 choice of design moves is typically both enabled and
 constrained by the prevailing characteristics of its design
 capital, as well as by the firm's overall strategy and the
 resources available to the designers. The remainder of the
 paper explores this duality between design moves and design
 capital through case studies of four digital businesses.
 Research Methodology
 Data
 We conducted an embedded multiple-case study (Yin 2009)
 of four firms operating in different industries: enterprise
 software, wireless test and measurement equipment, mobile
 applications, and communication services. We gained access
 to these firms as a result of prior research engagements, and
 observed their evolution over a multi-year period between
 2002 and 2010. We visited each firm for periods of two
 weeks at a time over an observation period of two to five
 years, during which interviews and participant observations
 were conducted with the executive leadership, project and
 product managers, and engineering staff. Follow-up inter-
 views were conducted in the subsequent years. In each case,
 we collected quantitative, observational, and interview data
 on design decisions relating to applications, products, plat-
 forms, and services; the outcomes that resulted from those
 decisions; and a variety of context-specific factors such as the
 542 MIS Quarterly Vol. 37 No. 2/June 2013
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 influence of prior business outcomes, organization and project
 level conditions, architectural dependencies and affordances,
 and broader changes in the industry environment. For the
 enterprise software and test equipment firms, we also directly
 observed multiple versions of software source code together
 with associated project management and product release data.
 Case Analysis
 Our analysis of each case site began with the identification of
 the design moves involved. Then, using the design move as
 a unit of analysis, we examined how the prevailing design
 capital and other contextual factors influenced the sequence
 of design moves over time, as well as the effects of each
 design move on the firm's design capital. Finally, we con-
 ducted cross-case analyses to develop propositions about the
 conceptualized dualities between design capital and design
 moves.
 Tracing Design Moves. We traced the design moves by iden-
 tifying and cataloging the design changes in the products we
 studied at our case firms, and organizing these changes into
 sequences based on temporal and causal precedence. A
 design move can thus be viewed as a logical grouping of
 sequential design changes.4 We established temporal prece-
 dence using product release data, source code version data,
 and the descriptions of case informants. To establish causal
 linkages between design changes, we paid careful attention to
 whether a design change provided a technological affordance
 or an architectural quality on which a subsequent design
 change depended. Establishing causal precedence in this way
 helped us to empirically trace the dual relationship between
 design moves and design capital by clearly establishing both
 the state of the firm's design capital at the beginning of the
 move and the impact of the move in terms of a transition to
 another state. Further, the temporal and causal sequencing of
 moves helped us to distinguish the "optional" nature of certain
 moves from simple path dependence (Adner and Levinthal
 2004)., A move was viewed as the exercise of a design option
 if it was not a necessary consequence of any prior move.
 To characterize the state of design capital before and after
 each move, we coded the relative levels of option value and
 technical debt at these points in time, iterating between first-
 order analysis - giving voice in the interpretation of case
 events to the people who actually experienced them (Van
 Maanen 1 988) - and second-order analysis of design changes
 design changes tend to follow patterns. Baldwin and Clark (2000) identified
 six patterns that occur in the design of modular systems. In the Appendix we
 discuss the relationship between design moves and these patterns, which they
 formalize as modular operators.
 observed using product- and system-level data. We did not
 employ quantitative measures of option value or technical
 debt; developing and applying such measures remains an open
 area for future work.
 Understanding the Strategic Context. After plotting the
 sequence of design moves within each case, we systematically
 examined their strategic intent, actual outcomes, and the
 environmental and organizational considerations that influ-
 enced them. Multiple authors independently coded the
 strategic context associated with each design move using the
 case narratives we developed jointly, and resolved discrep-
 ancies in the coding during two separate peer-review sessions.
 In two cases, we had to completely rely on first-order inter-
 pretive data for our coding, whereas, in the other cases, we
 were able to corroborate the interpretive data with detailed
 quantitative metrics drawn from project management and
 product release records.
 Resource munificence - that is, the availability of critical
 resources needed to operate within an environment (Castro-
 giovanni 1 99 1 ; Dess and Beard 1 984; Staw and Szwajkowski
 1975) - emerged early in our analysis as a salient aspect of
 the strategic context for a firm's design moves. Designers
 working under low munificence (resource scarcity) typically
 faced long working hours and challenging expectations, while
 those in situations of high munificence (resource abundance)
 typically enjoyed more organizational slack. Other strategic
 continge cies emerged later (e.g., the level of technical
 capability in the organization responsible for a design move).
 When this occurred, we retraced the relevant design moves
 a d coded the new contingency variable.
 Developing Propositions. In the final phase of our analysis,
 we formally conceptualized an emergent theory by conducting
 a cross-case a alysis on the design moves to develop testable
 propositions. Following a standard process of theory devel-
 opment using case data (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007), we
 adopted an iterative approach, repeatedly comparing our
 emergent theory with the case evidence and prior theory.
 Eventually, our interpretations converged to a common con-
 ceptualization of design moves and their relationship to option
 value and technical debt, which in turn led to the propositions
 that are presente  in the paper.
 Reliability and Validity
 We took several measures to ensure the reliability of our case
 data, the validity of our empirical constructs, and the external
 and internal validity of our analysis. We sought to improve
 reliability by (1) organizing case records for each firm in the
 same way, (2) using multiple observers to take notes during
 MIS Quarterly Vol. 37 No. 2/June 2013 543
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 conversations with case informants, (3) reconciling any
 discrepancies through discussions among observers and/or
 follow-up clarification by informants, and (4) conducting
 periodic peer reviews of the interpretations and conclusions
 that emerged from our analysis. Construct validity was
 enhanced by using multiple sources of evidence gathered
 from different informants, and by establishing a chain of
 evidence from both the first-order interpretive data and the
 second-order archival data. Although we selected our cases
 by convenience, the sample and our case analysis procedures
 do not pose a serious threat to external or internal validity.
 The cases were similar in that they all concerned digital
 businesses - that is, digital artifacts were core to each firm's
 business operations and ecosystem relationships. Our sample
 also exhibits variation in the types of design moves that were
 enacted and the antecedents we studied, which facilitated the
 exploration of differences in the dynamics of formulating and
 executing digital business strategies across the four cases.
 Case Descriptions and Findings
 Softsys
 Softsys is a multinational software product development and
 services company established in 1989 with worldwide
 revenues of about US$50 million in 201 1-12. The company
 is part of a US$800 million business conglomerate with
 diversified operations in the manufacturing and alternative
 energy sectors. Table 1 summarizes the set of design moves
 enacted by Softsys between 1989 and 2010, along with the
 conditions under which these moves were made and their
 impact on the firm's design capital. In addition, Figure 2(a)
 illustrates these moves visually using a design capital map
 (see Figure 1).
 The goal of the first set of design moves enacted between
 1989 and 1993 (labeled 1 A, IB, and 1C) was to rapidly trans-
 form a single-client manufacturing resource planning (MRP)
 application into a mass-customized enterprise software suite
 with a sustainable installed base beyond the sister companies
 within the conglomerate. Since a mass-customized software
 product caters to the needs of heterogeneous clients, a key
 feature was the ability to configure the product to satisfy the
 needs of individual clients. Move 1 A entailed developing a
 systematic configuration mechanism that pulled together
 scattered configuration information, and creating a configura-
 tion engine module - a design option that product developers
 could use in the future to help clients configure the MRP
 application easily. This move sought to enhance the option
 value of the firm's design capital, as shown in Figure 2(a).
 Move IB built on the option created by 1A and entailed
 replacing the previous configuration engine with an enhanced
 version that helped designers to track and store clients'
 configuration information in a centrally controlled database.
 As Softsys clients configured and deployed the product, the
 company collected a large repository of system configuration
 data and business rules implemented by its clients in the
 manufacturing sector.
 Move 1C leveraged the new configuration repository to help
 Softsys product implementation teams match end-user
 requirements with the configuration information found in the
 repository and substitute default system configuration settings
 with the closest matches found in the repository. The
 configuration settings suggested by this solution were often
 far from ideal due to poorly specified end-user requirements,
 leading to more expensive post-implementation system
 changes. Thus, move 1C increased the technical debt of sys-
 tems implemented at client sites. However, the move was
 seen as a crucial step in reducing the initial cost of implemen-
 tation at a time when the firm's available resources for
 product development were diminishing and managers were
 under intense pressure to expand the product's installed base.
 Collectively, this set of design moves gave the Softsys
 product implementation team the capability to configure the
 product easily and reduce implementation time and costs
 without the use of expensive third-party functional consul-
 tants. Moreover, Softsys was also able to offset most of its
 system configuration-related technical debt (i.e., the cost of
 post-implementation changes) through annual maintenance
 contracts with clients. Thus, the first set of Softsys design
 moves built high-quality design capital that the firm used to
 position itself as a low-cost enterprise software vendor and
 launch competitive actions such as disintermediating the role
 of functional consultants in the small and medium business
 segment of the enterprise software industry.
 In the mid-1990s, Softsys further leveraged its design capital
 to mine "best practices" from its configuration repositories
 and offer consulting and system integration services for small
 and medium businesses looking to ride the enterprise resource
 planning (ERP) wave. As Softsys's system integration ser-
 vices grew rapidly, tensions began to build between the
 product development and services divisions of the firm. Ser-
 vice personnel facing heterogeneous customer needs wanted
 immediate, client-specific solutions whereas the product
 development team aimed for mass customized functionality
 with a structured product release schedule. Moreover, as the
 services team enrolled high-value customers who demanded
 immediate fixes, the product development team was con-
 stantly fire-fighting, leaving little room for well-designed and
 forward looking product functionality. Design moves 2A, 2B,
 and 2C were enacted in this environment with an aim to
 balance the tensions between the services and product devel-
 opment Softsys teams. These design moves created and
 developed "custom extensions," which were extensions to
 544 MIS Quarterly Vol. 37 No. 2/June 2013
 Woodard et al. /Design Capital and Design Moves
 Design Strategic State of Strategie Impact of
 Move Intent Design Actions Design Capital Contingencies Design Move
 Expose configuration settings, create configuration _ .. * Option _ .. Resource -
 1A Simplify scripts, collate configuration information into * a new constrained abundance Create - options
 product configuration engine module
 configuration, ~ Create a configuration database and add new logging ... u ... Resource - . .. 1B .. . ~ .. ' . .. ...... r ... High a u quality ... ' . . Create - . options ..
 disintermediate .. . .. functionality . .. ...... to the configuration r engine a ' abundance . .
 functional Enable consultants to search configuration database to Resource
 1 C consultants alter default configuration settings during implementa- High quality . * Increase debt
 tion at the client site scarcity *
 Expose function calls for modification by clients, create j i Rp^ni irpp
 2A Ku sue dual j i tooļ set to appenc| user-written arguments to function High quality . * Increase debt
 low-cost cails scarcity
 product plus implement customer exit points that allow clients to ... . ... Resource . . . . 2B value-added J * . r .■*. High ... 3 . quality ... 3 * . Increase debt . . . add their own source code to * create . new r functionality .■*. 3 3 scarcity* *
2 a egy Develop a new tool set to help customers manage their Debt Resource Increase debt
 exit-point portfolios constrained scarcity*
 Remove all customer-written functionality and port ^ Abandon options
 OA mui Achieve neve . . , . . , , , Debt ^ Resource _ . , .. OA 3A mui neve product . . , s source code . to . a component-based , , , . . . , . Reduce _ . debt , ..
 without Create an application 0_ efficiency; build . . . x A . . . . u. . ... Resource _ ^ . 3B 0_ . inclusion . . . of x customer-written A components r . in . the . . u. High 3 . quality ... 3 . . Create ^ . options . business L.A  r 3 3 abundance . .
 component architecture L.A A
 ecosystem Include ability to add third-party components via High a quality ReS0U/C.? Abandon options
 *With high ability to transfer technical debt **With low ability to transfer technical debt
 default system modules that helped customers modify the
 ault system behavior (e.g., data proc s ing, report
 definitions, and results p inting). Design ove 2A entailed
 exposing certain function calls to end users and creating a tool
 set to append e d- ser written arguments to the exposed calls.
 Move 2B facilitated the in egration of cus mer-written code
 with default business logic in order to customize the system
 behavior, and move 2C involved the develop ent of a new set
 of tools for customers' use. These tools allowed users to
 create and manage custom extensions themselves.
 The custom extension design option conceived by move 2A
 helped Softsys services teams address customer-specific
 needs quickly in the short term without waiting for the stan-
 dard mass-market releases from the product development
 team. This helped the business pursue a dual low-cost pro-
 duct plus value-added services strategy and fend off competi-
 tion from both incumbent product vendors such as SAP and
 Oracle and system integration service companies such as
 Accenture and Capgemini, all of whom were aggressively
 targeting the small and medium business enterprise software
 sector. However, as a result of moves 2B and 2C, designers
 also accumulated higher levels of technical debt because of
 the explosive growth in the number of custom extension
 poin s and the inability of the designers to govern and control
 the quality of customer-written software code. Bad customer-
 written code often caused undesirable system hangs and
 crashes that were hard to diagnose and rectify. Thus, as
 shown in Figure 2(a), Softsys had tra sitioned into a debt-
 constrained state.
 By 2000, the balancing act between the firm's product devel-
 opment and services divisions became critically vulnerable.
 As the number of custom extensions grew from a handful to
 thousands with the rapid growth in the product's installed
 base, it became impossible for the product development team
 to track, test, and ensure the compatibility of the large set of
 custom extensions against rtew product releases. Thus, the
 locally optimized customer-specific software code built by
 Softsys system integrators using the custom extensions could
 rarely be preserved during regular product upgrades. This
 situation started a vicious cycle of building and discarding
 custom extensions with little sustained value to the installed
 base. Further, Microsoft announced new middleware com-
 ponents that were incompatible with the custom extensions
 d signed by Softsys. Hence, Softsys eventually chose to
 abandon the custom extension option and move toward
 Microsoft's new middleware offerings.
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 The abandonment of its custom extension option was the
 starting point for the third set of Softsys design moves (3 A,
 3B, and 3C), which focused on developing a product devel-
 opment architecture that was more robust to the cyclical
 standardization and customization needs triggered by the
 firm's dual product plus services strategy. Move 3 A involved
 separating the default system modules from customer-written
 code and moving the original system modules to a new
 architecture that supported component-based system devel-
 opment. Move 3B entailed the development and integration
 of a new application composer module that facilitated the
 inclusion of customer-written components. Move 3C helped
 designers to easily identify and swap customer- written com-
 ponents and easily trace their dependencies on the original
 system components. These design moves established a robust
 component-based architecture platform for product develop-
 ment - an option that could be used to achieve flexibility in
 product customizations without compromising product devel-
 opment efficiency or the ability to achieve benefits from mass
 customization. As shown in Figure 2(a), these design moves
 reduced technical debt and moved the firm into a high-quality
 design capital state.
 The modular component-based architecture enabled Softsys
 services teams to integrate third-party software easily and at
 the same time helped the product development teams to test
 and verify cross-platform compatibility more efficiently.
 Softsys leveraged the design options created by the com-
 ponent architecture move to develop the capability to partici-
 pate in "consortium bids," that is, to partner with multiple
 third-party vendors in order to jointly service larger well-
 established firms that typically spend more on IT. Our obser-
 vation period for the Softsys case ended in 2010 with the
 completion of move 3C, which entailed abandoning some of
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 the older component-based architecture design options in
 pursuit of newer technologies and processes such as service-
 oriented architecture and model-driven development. By
 2010, Softsys had successfully built a sustainable partner
 ecosystem consisting of key players such as IBM Global
 Services, and was well positioned for the next phase of
 growth with an installed base of more than 1,000 clients,
 including several Fortune 100 companies such as Boeing.
 Testco
 Testco is a multinational firm with more than 60 years of
 experience in developing test and measurement equipment for
 electrical circuits, wireless networks, and industrial equip-
 ment. It is a member of a diversified business group with
 operations in medical technologies and industrial test and
 measurement equipment, with product sales of about US$16
 billion in 2011. Our case study traces the evolution of a
 strategic hardware and software product developed by
 Testco' s wireless test and measurement unit beginning in
 1999. The design moves enacted by the firm between 1999
 and 2004, the conditions under which these moves were
 made, and their impact on Testco' s design capital are sum-
 marized in Table 2 and Figure 2(b).
 In 1999, Testco had low levels of both option value and
 technical debt. In this option-constrained state, Testco's
 design moves 1A and IB depict how the firm attempted to
 exploit its recently acquired assets in networking solutions to
 explore new business opportunities in a neighboring techno-
 logical landscape, namely, short-range wireless communi-
 cation. Move 1A, enacted in early 1999, helped Testco to
 reuse a key signal processing module of an existing wireless
 network connectivity product, and in turn initiate a new
 product line in short-range wireless communication test and
 measurement equipment. Testco designers did so by exposing
 the interfaces of the signal processing module in the existing
 product, enabling potential reuse of the module in a different
 context - an option that aided rapid product development.
 Testco's next design move, IB, integrated the reused signal
 processing module with a special purpose best-of-breed
 product architecture. The best-of-breed architecture created
 by move IB helped Testco designers preserve the reused
 signal processing module written in the C programming
 language, but pursue new product development using the
 Microsoft Visual C++ and Java programming languages.
 However, the interfaces between the components written in
 different programming languages had to be constantly modi-
 fied as the new languages rapidly evolved and their standard
 libraries kept changing. Thus, Testco accumulated technical
 debt due to the best-of-breed architecture and could not fully
 exploit the options embedded in the reused signal processing
 module.
 The first set of design moves (1 A and IB) enabled the Testco
 product development team to pursue rapid new product devel-
 opment despite being new to the domain. Moreover designers
 were able to manage the uncertainty that arose from intense
 competition between the Microsoft and Java technology
 platforms. In Testco's industry, speed is of the essence as test
 and measurement products need to be several cycles ahead of
 the downstream product development projects in which they
 are used. Thus, the options created by Testco's first set of
 design moves were instrumental in aiding the firm to launch
 its products quickly in an uncertain and immature techno-
 logical environment. However, as shown in Figure 2(b), the
 net result of the first set of moves (1A and IB) was that
 Testco had migrated to a state of low-quality design capital
 because of the technical debt incurred in pursuing its best-of-
 breed architecture.
 By early 2000, Microsoft announced extensive support for the
 popular hardware tools used for wireless testing and mea-
 surement applications, and provided a clear roadmap for the
 .NET platform and C# programming language, which posi-
 tioned Microsoft technologies to dominate the test and mea-
 surement market. At the same time, Testco's wireless test and
 measurement products had gained traction in the market. In
 this environment, Testco designers enacted design move 2 A
 by completely rewriting the signal processing module using
 Microsoft technologies and creating a new signal analyzer
 component. This move helped designers reduce the accumu-
 lated technical debt due to the earlier best-of-breed design and
 aided the development of an architecture that facilitated self-
 contained "sandboxes" (isolated environments to experiment
 with new technologies and wireless standards). As a result,
 Testco was able to position its test and measurement products
 as standards-neutral in an environment where short-range
 wireless standards such as Bluetooth were still emerging and
 key players such as Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, Intel, and
 Microsoft had different competing conceptualizations of the
 market. As shown in Figure 2(b), this design move enhanced
 the quality of the firm's design capital. In its subsequent
 design move (2B), Testco sought to relax the rigid com-
 patibility constraints of the new signal analyzer components.
 Further, its designers made the interfaces of the experimental
 sandboxes more accessible and allowed open-source software
 communities to create libraries for different versions of stan-
 dards and easily map them to configurations of Testco signal
 analyzer components. Although contributions from open
 source communities helped the firm negotiate its product
 development trajectory in an uncertain standards environment,
 integrating these contributions was a challenge. To overcome
 MIS Quarterly Vol. 37 No. 2/June 2013 547
 Woodard et ai/Design Capital and Design Moves
 Design Strategie State of Strategie Impact of
 Move Intent Design Actions Design Capital Contingencies Design Move
 Exploit existing Expose interfaces to signal processing module of Option Resource i A . . i . . cre te optio s
 technology to acquired . . product i . constrained . abundance
 ^ ^ rapidly develop Extract signal processing module and integrate it with Option Resource Increase debt
 a new product a new best-of-breed system architecture constrained scarcity
 Replace signal processing module with a completely _ _
 Manage y stan- , , Resource _ Create _ options 2A y rewritten signal ' , analyzer , module, add a new Low quality , , . _ . ^ Ll
 dards uncer- ' , . . . . abundance* , , . _ Reduce . debt Ll
 experiment workbench , . . module . .
« ™ Expose r interfaces to experiment r workbench and signal ö «r™ open-source r » r ö Resource
 2B ecosystem analyzer modules, add mapping tools to allow High quality scarcity** Abandon options
 customer-written configurations to be plugged in
 te^rnove^o"1'11^ Reen9'neer dependencies between workbench and
 3A ad'acent signal analyzer modules; move maps, experiment Debt Resource Create options
 , , workbench, and signal analyzer modules to a new constrained abundance Reduce debt
 technology , , ^ architecture
 landscapes
 Support domi-
 nant standards Add a digital * rights management module to the product ... . 1VŁ Resource . , , 3B . * ; High ... . quality 1VŁ Abandon . , , options
 to sustain family . architecture scarcity**
 With high technical capability **With low ability to transfer technical debt
 it, Testco engineers had to abandon certain design options in
s n wly created signal analyzer module that mp sed rig d
s andardization and reliabilit  constraints, and in th  p ocess
 in dve ten ly allowed po r-quality cod o creep into the
ystem. Thus, s Testco sought to cater t  differe  open-
sourc  communities, it incurred high echnical debt and
 mov d t  a debt-constra ed design capital state.
B  2002, Testco had garnere  more than 60 percent of the
 sh rt-range wireless test an  measureme t market. The third
et of design move (3A d 3B) w re acted to capitalize
on this domi ant po i ion by further consolidating he product
 architecture. Specifically, these moves generalized the inte -
fa es betwee  th  core componen s f the product suc  as the
signal analyzer component a d t e experimental open- urce
 p kages, and added r bust standards t aceabili y mech-
anisms. By g neralizing the interfaces in the product arc i-
tecture through move 3 A, Testco designe s created options in
 he product architecture to support the development of a
family of products based on the same u de lying platf rm.
T mproved APIs offered by this new pro uct fa ily archi-
 tectu e helped Testco d signers mor efficiently er
qualit  checks on he open-source cod  contributed by the
end- s  commu i y, an  th eby avoid cos ly maintenanc .
 Testco lev raged the option  created by the product family
architecture to maximize i s scope conomies by c teri g to
 differe  i dustry segments be nd he origi al sh t-range
wireless s c or, such s vide  a d aud o signal a alyzers. As
ho n in Fig re 2(b), this design move ga n enhanc d the
 qualit  of Te co' design cap al.
O r observations of Testco's r duct develop e t traj ctory
 c l i ated wi h the sh lving f t e specific short-r ge
wi el s t s product w udi d, bu Test o successfull
expanded he c fam ly a chit c ur  built from th
 original pl tf rm. Mov  3B, the fi l design move tha  we
bs rve , help d product an g tr e, con rol, a d er-
m nat  product va ian s by addin a digi al rights man gem nt
 odule t ev ry in  a ily. By c n rolling the
"r gh s" t ad  to th  pr d c  amily, T s co designe s w
able to s rategically termi a  v ri ts t at w re p ceiv d as
 und sirabl  to th  overall pro u t eco y m. Fo exa ple,
wh n  dominant Bl ooth s a  eme ged n th market,
Testc  aban oned pen-s urc  roduct va iants th  viol t d
 he d minant stan d. While the incl sion of righ s anage-
nt en iled abandon g op i s r lat d o cert in no -
s a ard rod c  varia ts, i  enabl d Tes co o es ablish a rich
 pl tf m cosyste  that allowed wid -ra ging c s omization
while taining bil o anag the c system through
eff i e c trol f undesi ed v riati n. As a n resul ,
 Testco's design capit l co t nue t  re ain n a high-q a ity
 state.
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 Cellsys
 Cellsys is a mobile application platform development firm,
 established in 2006, which focuses on operator- and platform-
 independent product development for mobile phones. In
 201 1, Cellsys served more than 16 million end-users and had
 a stable clientele of more than 10 leading mobile telecommu-
 nication operators such as Vodafone, France Telecom's
 Orange, and Hutchison's Three. Cellsys was also recognized
 as a technological innovator and had won several awards
 including the Red Herring Global 100. The design moves
 enacted by Cellsys between 2006 and 2010, the conditions
 under which these moves were made, and their impact on the
 firm's design capital are summarized in Table 3 and Figure
 2(c).
 As a startup company in 2006, Cellsys primarily focused on
 creating a portfolio of applications written in Objective-C for
 various devices on Apple's Mac OS X and iOS platforms,
 hoping to generate revenues from the growing user base for
 Apple's consumer devices. Move 1 A extended the design of
 the firm's social media aggregator application by including
 additional modules to capture finer-grained details about user
 behavior in the various social media applications such as
 Facebook, Twitter, Orkut, and Yahoo! Messenger. The move
 created an option for Cellsys to mine user behavior on social
 media platforms and offer personalized recommendations, as
 well as mobile games and advertisements. However, Apple
 reviewers who control the distribution of applications through
 the iTunes App Store rejected Cellsys's first product, a social
 media application suite, built on the design option created by
 move 1 A. Citing unauthorized features and API usage, Apple
 reviewers objected to the feature of Cellsys suite that facili-
 tated automatic installation of user-generated content and
 applications on the iPhone without going through the iTunes
 App Store. That is, Apple reviewers enforced their control
 and objected to the "platform within a platform" scenario
 embedded in the Cellsys design.
 Resilient to the rejection from the iTunes App Store, Cellsys
 designers pursued a platform-independent design (design
 move IB) and positioned the product for distribution to a
 wide range of other mobile platforms, including Microsoft's
 Windows Mobile, Google's Android, Nokia's Symbian, and
 Sun's J2ME. In addition to this "multi-homing" strategy, the
 Cellsys social media application suite was redesigned to be
 distributed as a standalone installer through the official
 marketplaces of the mobile platforms as well as through
 independent application stores on the Internet. This design
 move helped Cellsys achieve a quick take-off, attracting more
 than 10 million users through a peer-to-peer distribution
 network that leveraged the digital word-of-mouth effects of its
 social applications. However, it increased the firm' s technical
 debt because of the need to repeatedly change the installation
 package of the Cellsys application to address the various
 incompatibilities across the rapidly evolving mobile plat-
 forms, thereby dragging the firm into a debt-constrained state.
 Despite being laden with high technical debt, Cellsys was
 spurred by the success of the multi-homing social media
 application and began to add applications targeted at mobile
 telecommunication operators to the Cellsys social media suite
 (move 2A). This option enabled Cellsys to pursue a product
 family strategy encompassing both retail end-users as well as
 the mobile operators' corporate clientele. Cellsys leveraged
 the design capital built on its multi-homing design option to
 develop a new value proposition for the operators: they could
 offer sticky services to end users without worrying about the
 incompatibilities between the mobile devices that these users
 might carry. Through this value proposition, in 2008 Cellsys
 was able to bring on board its platform more than 10 leading
 mobile operators in Europe, the Middle East, South East Asia,
 and Australia. As the product family strategy of Cellsys
 matured, designers split the features of the Cellsys platform
 into two distinct products, one catering to retail end users and
 the other to mobile operator corporate customers (move
 2B) - a design which reduced the technical debt of the multi-
 homing architecture. This helped Cellsys designers shed
 debt-prone integration mechanisms between the two systems,
 scale their product development efforts quickly, and cater to
 the needs of the two distinct user bases more efficiently. As
 a net result, the firm transitioned to a high-quality design
 capital state.
 The third set of design moves (3A, 3B, and 3C) focused on
 creating options for enabling user-led innovation. Designers
 created an open API and an end-user accessible software
 development kit (move 3 A). They created an option to allow
 third-party programmers to develop applications, such as
 social media games, for the Cellsys platform. The next design
 move (3B), created an iTunes-style application store and an
 option for the mobile telecommunication operators to launch
 their own platform-independent (but operator-specific) appli-
 cations for end users. The third design move (3C) created a
 similar application store for retail end users. These design
 moves continued to reinforce the high quality of the firm's
 design capital and established a broad reach in the program-
 mer communities associated with three major mobile
 platforms - Windows, Android, and Java. All of these com-
 munities were eager to build applications and distribute them
 to the company's large base of end users and network
 operators. The continued high quality of its design capital
 benefitted Cellsys in executing its digital business strategy
 through a slew of digital offerings, including home-grown and
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 Design Strategic State of Strategie Impact of
 Move Intent Design Actions Design Capital Contingencies Design Move
 Integrate the ¡Phone social media aggregator app with a - .. _ X • . j * .. *■ j Option - .. _ Resource _ .
 1A Multi-homina a new system X including • . meta-data j * collection .. *■ and j game Ł . . . . . Create _ . options a .  , . , constrained Ł ab ndant
 and platform center . framework m , modules . ,
 independence Create variants of the system for Android, Symbian, ... , ... Resource . . .. 1B , . .... . ./... . . . J ... High 3 , quality ... ' .. # . Increase debt . .. Blackberry, , . .... Windows . Mobile, and . Java . platforms . 3 ' scarcity* .. #
 2A Pursue a Add an operator services module to the Cellsys product constrained abundance Create options
 on ołrołónw Create two distinct product designs for retail end users Debt Resource _ . . . . 2B on strategy ołrołónw • ^ _ Reduce . debt . . . and telecommunication • network operators constrained ^ abundance
 Expose the APIs of the system to end users, create a _ Rp^nurrp
 3A Enable user- software development kit for end-user application High quality abundance Create options
 «o in the retail Create an operator app store module for corporate K ... . ... Resource _ 3B «o , app K High ... . quality ... , . Create _ options
 and operator customers , abundance , .
 ecosystems Resource
 3C Create a marketplace module for retail end users High quality abundance Create options
 *With high ability to transfer technical debt
 partner-developed games as well as white-labeled products
 and services for a variety of telecommunication operators.
 Infocom
 Infocom is an integrated information and communication
 services provider with over US$2 billion in annual revenues
 from over two million end users of its mobile telecom-
 munications, cable television (TV), and broadband Internet
 service offerings. We studied the evolution of the firm's core
 IT systems, which supported the three service divisions of the
 company from 2001 until 2010. The set of design moves
 enacted by Infocom during this period, along with the condi-
 tions under which these moves were made and their impact on
 the firm's design capital, are summarized in Table 4 and
 Figure 2(d).
 Infocom came into existence in 2000 as a result of a three-
 way merger between firms that operated separately in the
 cable TV, residential broadband, and mobile telecommu-
 nication sectors. Immediately after the merger, the company
 turned its focus to integrating the back-end processes of the
 three separate service divisions without disrupting services for
 their existing customers, with the goal of gaining economies
 of scale in the administrative and operational functions of the
 company. Because the firm's IT personnel did not have the
 luxury of clean-slate integration, they had to constantly fire-
 fight, managing the day-to-day operation of the existing
 services while working to consolidate the firm's back-end
 processes and systems. Therefore, the firm's design capital
 was of poor quality. The first set of design mov s (1A, IB,
 and 1C) were enacted with the aim of achieving loose
 coupling between the various back-end IT systems, including
 the billing and account management applications of the three
 services divisions of the firm. The first design move (1A)
 exposed the interfaces of these back-end systems and spe-
 cified the necessary adapters that could hook the applications
 to a common database schema. This created an option to
 pursue a loose coupling approach for integrating the back-end
 systems without disrupting services for existing customers.
 As a result of the expansion of option value, the firm
 transitioned to the debt-constrained state.
 Once the adapters became operational, Infocom' s IT per-
 so nel attempted to build a common customer relationship
 management (CRM) system for the firm on top of the estab-
 lished loosely coupled integration mechanism. Early studies
 exploring the feasibility of such a design revealed fatal
 incompatibilities between the billing applications of the three
 service divisions, which were a hurdle to building a common
 CRM platform. While the loose coupling approach enabled
 the coexistence of the different applications, it did not scale
 up to the performance needs of the planned CRM platform
 and required costly manual intervention in reconciling errors
 that arose during data integration. Hence, Infocom abandoned
 the common database schema built on the loose coupling
 design option and reverted back to three separate billing
 applications for the three service divisions (move IB). This
 reduced the technical debt induced by the earlier loose-coupling
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 Design Strategie State of Strategie Impact of
 Move Intent Design Actions Design Capital Contingencies Design Move
 „ A Expose the billing application interfaces of the mobile, . ... Resource _ . ..
 Integrate three TV and broadband ISP business units
 10 iTnesimobile6 Create individual and integrate a custom of CRM the three module u. -ri# in ividual billing a applications of the three business , > . .. 0 cable u. TV, -ri# , . a constrained , > . scarcity .. 0 Reduce debt
 , ,, , units , .
^ I5PJ Create an account manager module to collate billing Option Resource Increase debt
 details for customer's mobile, TV, and ISP accounts constrained scarcity
 71 Replace legacy billing applications with new billing L a|jt Resource create options modules abundance*
 FnahiP «¡Pif- Replace legacy billing applications with new integrated R„„lirr„
 2B , CRM/billing * system, 3 move all customer accounts into . . . . . Create options service for , .. * 3 constrained . . . abundance . .
 the .. new system
epl ce count manager module with a new applica- ^ ^ Resource
 2C tion, migrate * all accounts to new CRM system 3 using * . . . .. Abandon options . * 3 * constrained . . . scarcity ..
 unique . self-service IDs
 OA Expose integrated CRM/billing system interface to Option Resource _ . .. OA 3A Enab ecross- ■ . « . . Create _ . options ..
 social ■ media applications constrained . « abundance . .
dling of Create and inte9rate a marketing, promotion, and Resource
 3B loyalty J J module that can use data from social media High « quality / . . Increase debt services J J u u . « / abundance . .
 *With low technical capability
 design, but also reduced the options available to designers to
implemen  c mmon Infocom CRM platform. Thus, a ne
 result of move IB was to transition the firm's design capital
to an option-constrained state.
 After abandoning the loosely coupled design, Infocom' s IT
organization was und r pr ssure to find alternate ways to
 move toward a common billing and CRM mechanism for he
thre  service divisions. They responded by imple enting a
 system that collected customer information (e.g., billing
details) from the three separate billing applications and pre-
 sented it t  an end user through a common website portal for
account manag ment (move 1C). This design was fa  from
 ideal and imposed additional technical bt related to main-
 taining three differen  applicatio s serving the same business
fu ctionality. Further, although Infocom customers could
 check their bills through  common web interface, it was still
 cumbersome for them to have three different accounts with
 separate bills for their services. This resulted in a surge in
 billing-related queries and account-management tickets for
 Infocom engineers, further reducing their capacity to work
 toward a common CRM platform. Thus, as shown in Figure
 2(d), move 1C returned Infocom to a poor quality design-
 capital state with high technical debt and low option value.
 Infocom' s second set of design moves (2 A, 2B, and 2C) were
 enacted to address the need for tighter integration between the
 various service divisions. Using a fresh infusion of capital by
 the firm's top management to support an initiative for tighter
 integration, designers replaced legacy billing applications
 with modern commercially available products ( ove 2A).
 These products had well-established mechanisms for facili-
 tating cross-application integration. This made feasible the
 integrated CRM pl tform that was earlier ttempted in vain.
 Infocom IT personnel, working with contracted systems
 integration professionals, then replaced the individual CRM
 application modules in the legacy billing systems with a new
 integrated CRM database (move 2B). This in itself created
 more design options for launching specific applications in the
 future. For example, to reconcile the differences in billing
 cycles of the three services for different customers (TV,
 broadband, and mobile services), Infocom launched a new
 account management module that offered a self-service
 mechanism for customers to lpg in and choose a design for an
 integrated bill. Thus, move* 2A transitioned Infocom to a
 debt-constrained state and move 2B further expanded the
 firm's option value while it remained debt constrained overall.
 The new account management module and its self-service
 feature, however, had an unexpected consequence of com-
 plicating the firm's customer rewards and loyalty programs.
 Although engineers had ported the older rewards and loyalty
 points into the integrated CRM database, they had not anti-
 cipated the variety of ways that customers would want to
 bundle their three service bills and the corresponding loyalty
 points. Some customers preferred to keep their bills and asso-
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 ciated loyalty points separate for certain billing cycles, but
 have them bundled for certain other billing cycles. The inte-
 grated CRM database and the new account management
 module could not automatically handle all of these customer-
 created loyalty point bundles, often resulting in erroneous
 printing of reward points tallies in the monthly bills sent to
 subscribers. Customer care agents and, in turn, engineers
 were burdened with a growing volume of requests for
 resolving problems with the custom bundling of loyalty
 points. Eventually, Infocom designers, on the advice of
 external system integration consultants, abandoned the
 account management module that allowed customers to create
 self-service billing bundles (move 2C) and replaced all self-
 created billing and loyalty point bundles by customers with
 standardized ones. Customers were issued standardized ser-
 vice bundles and account numbers, which they could use to
 electronically check their bills and service usage in real time.
 While the abandonment of some self-service account manage-
 ment mechanisms helped Infocom reduce maintenance costs,
 it also eradicated the customization options for end users.
 Thus, by the end of this set of design moves, the firm's design
 capital had once again become option constrained.
 Infocom' s final set of design moves began with one that
 exposed the APIs of the tightly integrated CRM and billing
 systems (move 3A). This created an option to develop mar-
 keting and loyalty modules that were accessible through end-
 user accounts in social media applications such as Facebook
 (move 3B). This move initially imposed technical debt on
 designers due to the immature and nonstandard interfaces of
 the various social media applications that were not compatible
 with each other. For example, the marketing and loyalty
 modules developed for Facebook were not readily portable to
 other social network platforms such as Orkut or Linkedln.
 However, as the various social media platforms matured,
 Infocom engineers were able to leverage third-party social
 media integration tools to reduce the burden of integration.
 Thus, moves 3A and 3B helped Infocom to sustain its high-
 quality design capital, enabling marketing managers in the
 three service divisions to launch and promote new service
 bundles and leverage cross-selling opportunities across the
 three types of service offerings.
 Summary
 As seen in Figures 2(a) and 2(c), the patterns of design moves
 at Softsys and Cellsys are visually similar. They represent the
 design moves of firms operating in mass-customized, high-
 growth product environments, where strategies that entail
 high debt are possible because the debt can be repaid by using
 rents extracted from locked-in customers. Both firms
 achieved high-quality design capital fairly early in their pro-
 duct life cycles, but rapid growth and demands from hetero-
 geneous customer bases led them to accumulate technical
 debt, dragging them into the debt-constrained zone. The firms
 were able to leverage their debt-taking strategy through entre-
 preneurial actions - launching systems integration services in
 the case of Softsys and operator-oriented services in the case
 of Cellsys - that helped them grow and generate revenue.
 Using their resources well, Softsys and Cellsys eventually
 paid down their debt through a series of moves that enabled
 them to achieve high-quality design capital.
 Figure 2(b) illustrates Testco's design moves, which are those
 of a technically competent firm operating in an environment
 of high clockspeed and volatile standards. Testco's designers
 managed uncertainty in short-range wireless protocol and pro-
 gramming language standards by constantly pursuing a wide
 range of options. Some of the options were debt-inducing
 because the volatile standards rendered the original designs
 irrelevant, but Testco's designers were able to write off the
 debt by abandoning the debt-laden options and quickly
 reorienting product development using alternative designs.
 Every time Testco found itself in a low-quality or debt-con-
 strained state, its engineers were quick to enact design moves
 that improved the quality of the firm's design capital. Even-
 tually, they were able to develop a robust platform archi-
 tecture that supported multiple product lines.
 The spiraling pathway of Infocom, shown in Figure 2(d),
 illustrates the struggles of product designers inheriting legacy
 systems and constantly fire-fighting to satisfy the firm's busi-
 ness needs. Although Infocom pursued an aggressive busi-
 ness strategy to offer bundled TV, mobile, and broadband
 services to its customers, its engineers struggled with limited
 design options to integrate the legacy systems. Plagued by
 frequent shifts in resource availability and external depen-
 dence for know-how, the firm found itself in a vicious cycle
 and oscillated between the option-constrained and debt-
 constrained states. Eventually, a large infusion of resources
 at the corporate level helped Infocom forge long-term con-
 tracts with external vendors. The firm was able to achieve
 high-quality design capital that could robustly support its
 business strategy to grow by offering integrated information
 and communication services.
 Design Capital and Design Moves:
 Toward a Design-Based Logic of
 Digital Business Strategy
 In our conceptual development, we identified design capital
 and design moves as fundamental to the emerging logic of
 digital business strategy. Design capital was defined in terms
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 of two dimensions, option value and technical debt, with
 high-quality design capital being characterized by high option
 value and low technical debt. Our case studies suggest that
 high-quality design capital places firms in a superior position
 to execute competitive actions. Each of the four firms in our
 study gained significant advantages as the quality of their
 design capital improved. They were able to launch digitally
 enabled products and services with greater speed and scale,
 react more rapidly to market opportunities or competitive
 threats, and more effectively shape their business ecosystems.
 However, not all firms are successful in possessing high-
 quality design capital at all times. All four case firms were
 constrained by high debt or lack of options (or both) at
 various times during our observation period.
 The role of design moves in our conceptual model is to pro-
 vide a structured way of thinking about the actions taken by
 firms in pursuit of high-quality design capital. By classifying
 design moves according to their effects on a firm's design
 capital (increasing or decreasing option value and technical
 debt), we can plot a sequence of moves as a path through the
 two-dimensional space defined by our design capital map
 (Figure 1). The four paths shown in Figure 2 provide a com-
 pact summary of our case evidence. They also offer a
 plausible target for explanatory theorizing, in the sense that it
 might be desirable for a theory of digital business strategy to
 explain why these paths are observed instead of others (or
 predict a firm's next move given its path to date). While this
 may be a worthy goal, it is fraught with both conceptual and
 practical difficulties, including the need to account for the
 influence of corporate-level strategy and industry-specific
 trends. Instead, we adopt the more modest goal of explaining
 the observed transitions between design capital states, using
 only information about the current state of a firm's design
 capital and a minimal set of additional contingencies.5
 As indicated in the earlier discussion of our research method-
 ology, resource munificence proved to be an important contin-
 gency in every design capital state. We observed that the
 level of resource munificence (or organizational slack avail-
 able to designers) often explained why firms in the same state
 made moves that took them in different "directions" (e.g.,
 from option-constrained design capital either rightward to
 high quality or downward to low quality). Higher levels of
 resource munificence allowed firms to move toward higher-
 quality design capital or leverage their stock of designs more
 effectively in creating digital offerings. On the other hand,
 5This is loosely analogous to a Markov model of a dynamical process. In
 reality, a firm's choice of design moves may be path-dependent and affected
 by many contingencies in a complex way. However, we believe it is still
 useful to view our case evidence through the lens of a simple "memoryless"
 model (Feller 1971).
 lower levels of resource munificence tended to constrain firms
 and compel them to either increase their technical debt or fail
 to exploit their options. We treated the level of resource
 munificence itself as exogenous, but noted that it was fre-
 quently cyclical: resources tended to be abundant at the
 beginning of a new project or when the firm was doing well,
 and scarce as product development deadlines approached or
 when the firm was under pressure to respond to a market
 opportunity or competitive threat.
 Technical capability, or the ability to deploy needed technical
 skills in executing a design move, emerged in our analysis as
 an important contingency. Although technical capability is
 related to resource munificence, we observed instances in
 which organizations with abundant resources were still con-
 strained by the level of technical capability available for a
 particular design move. Similarly, the ability to transfer tech-
 nical debt emerged in our analysis as an important contin-
 gency as we sought to explain why some firms under resource
 scarcity tended to abandon design options, whereas others
 tended to take on more technical debt. We observed that
 firms could sometimes shift the burden of their technical debt
 to their customers or other members of their business eco-
 system such as system integrators. For example, customers
 who are faced with high switching costs may be forced to
 bear the costs of incompatibility between releases of a ven-
 dor's product. Since firms that are able to transfer debt to
 other parties can significantly reduce their exposure to the
 future costs of their design decisions, they might be more
 inclined to make debt-increasing moves than firms that must
 bear these costs in full.
 Figure 3 summarizes the four pairs of propositions that
 emerged from our case studies. They are overlaid on a design
 capital map to illustrate that each pair applies to a specific
 quadrant. The figure further indicates the strategic contin-
 gencies that apply to each proposition, and the predicted
 impact of a design move enacted under the specified condi-
 tions. Table 5 presents the saine information in tabular form,
 along with a summary of the case evidence, both supporting
 and contradictory, for each proposition. In some moves, the
 predicted impact occurred, but it did not result in a change of
 design capital state, whereas, in other moves, the predicted
 impact occurred along with other impacts that were not pre-
 dicted. These instances are noted with asterisks to facilitate
 reconciling the table with the four paths shown in Figure 2.
 Option-Constrained Design Capital
 Startup firms and new business units tend to possess option-
 constrained design capital (the top-left quadrant of Figure 3).
 We observe that such firms can make two distinct kinds of
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 design moves: one kind increases the option value of its
 designs (i.e., a move to the right), while the other kind
 increases its technical debt (i.e., a move downward).
 To explain why a firm would make one kind of move rather
 than another, we focus attention on the relative level of
 resource munificence due to its strong theoretical and empiri-
 cal support in our setting. When resources are scarce,
 designers experience pressures to address urgent business
 needs without the necessary slack to lay a firm foundation for
 the future. Even skilled and well-intentioned designers often
 cut corners, exploiting existing options for short-term gain in
 ways that make it harder to create or exploit other options in
 the future. This leads to an accumulation of technical debt.
 For example, Testco reused an existing signal processing
 module when it was under pressure to launch a new product
 on an extremely aggressive schedule (Testco IB). Since
 speed was essential, Testco's designers made a conscious
 choice to accelerate the product cycle at the cost of accumu-
 lating technical debt, which they expected to eliminate by
 replacing the module in a future release cycle. Similarly, in
 the Infocom case, the firm accumulated technical debt by
 collating dat  from three legacy billing applications - rather
 than consolidating them - in order to address n urgent need
 to deliver integrated utility bills to customers (Infocom 1C).
 In contrast, when firms have abundant resources, designers
 have the necessary slack to ena t moves with a longer
 planning horizon, and often use this opportunity to create
 options that can be harvested in the future. Evidence from our
 cases lends support to this narrative. Designers at Softsys,
 Cellsys, and Infocom successfully applied abundant resources
 to create design options, thereby shifting their respective
 firms' design capital from an option-const aine  stat  to a
 high-quality one. Softsys created a new configuration engine
 (Softsys 1A), Cellsys created an option for multi-homing,
 allowing its application to run on a variety of mobile plat-
 forms (Cellsys 1A), and Infocom exposed an interface for
 social media applications (Infocom 3A).
 Based on this case evidence, we state our first pair of propo-
 sitions:
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 State of Design Impact of
 Proposition Capital Strategic Contingencies Design Move Supporting Contradictory
 P1a Option constrained Resource scarcity Increase debt None
 Softsys 1A
 Cellsvs 1A
 P1b Option constrained Resource abundance Create options infocom 3A None
 P2a Debt constrained Resource scarcity Abandon options Infocom 1 B**, 2C** Softsys 2C
 Cellsys 2B Cellsvs 2A
 P2b Debt constrained Resource abundance Reduce debt Softsys 3A** . .
 P3a Low quality ^ J yes°urc® technical abundanc® Reduce debt Testco 2A" None ^ J High technical capability
 P3b Low quality ^ J Resource abundance Create options r Infocom 2A None ^ J Low technical capability r
 «i • . ... Resource scarcity . . UA Softsys 1C*, 2A*, 2B K1
 H.gh «i • . quality ... High ability to transfer debt lncreasedebt . . UA Cellsys 1B None K1
 P4b High ** quality M 3 Resource scarcity Abandon options K None
 *Predicted impact occurred but did not change design capital state
 **Predicted impact occurred along with otherjmpacts not predicted
 Proposition la: Under option-constrained design capital
 and resource scarcity , a firm 's design moves will tend to
 i crease the technical debt of its design capital
 Proposition lb: Under option-constrained design capital
 and resource abundance, a firm 's design moves will tend
 to create design options in its design capital
 Debt-Constrained Design Capital
 In a debt-constrained design capital state, a firm possesses
 high option value, but it is weighed down by high levels of
 tec nical debt. Although its option richness ives it an
 advantage in being able to launch many offerings, the cost of
 exercising these options (e.g., in development effort to work
 around known bugs i  a system on which these offerings
 depe d) hampers its speed and effectiveness.
 As in the option-constrained state, the feasible paths out of a
 debt-constrained state depend on the level of resource munifi-
 cence. Under resource scarcity, investments in reducing
 technical ebt through additional development efforts are
 unlikely to e feasible, but firms can also eet their short-
 term obligations by abandoning debt-laden modules and their
 associated design options. While this might still leave a firm
 with a high level of technic l debt ( hifting its position
 horizontall to the left o  the design capital map into a low-
 quali y state), we were not urprised to see option abandon-
 ment used as a debt reduction strategy, resulting in diago al
 oves from debt-c strained to option-constrained states.
 For example, the desig ers at Infocom abando d their efforts
 to build a common database sche a across three separate
 billin  ap lications (move IB). While this move eliminated
 a potentially valuable option for unifying its billing platforms,
 it also freed the firm from risky and expensive integration
 efforts. Similarly, when Infocom abandoned a new account
 ma agement module tha  was causing headache  for custo-
 ers (move 2C), this mov  foreclosed t e option embedded
 in the rewards and loyalty programs t at were tied to this
 module, but it also reduced thp firm's cu tom r support costs.
 Conversely, debt-constrained firms that hav  acce s to abun-
 dant resources can afford to reduce their debt without aban-
 doning options, thereby moving toward the high-quality
 design capital state. For example, when Cellsys designers
 wanted to add operator-specific features to the Cellsys plat-
 form, they restructured the system into two different product
 variants, one for retail end users and the other for telecom-
 munication operators (move 2B). This design move elimi-
 nated the technic l debt associated with testing and ensuring
 compatibility in a tightly integrated system cateri g to two
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 different customer bases. At a later point, Cellsys designers
 pursued options for enabling user-led innovations, and they
 were then more easily able to add software development kits
 and application stores specific to each customer base. Two
 other moves (Softsys 3 A and Testco 3 A) also propelled firms
 from a debt-constrained design capital state to a high-quality
 state. These moves were more complex as they involved the
 creation and/or abandonment of design options as well.6
 These observations lead to our next pair of propositions:
 Proposition 2a: Under debt-constrained design capital and
 resource scarcity, a firm's design moves will tend to
 abandon design options.
 Proposition 2b: Under debt-constrained design capital and
 resource abundance , a firm 's design moves will tend to
 reduce its technical debt.
 Although these propositions may be intuitive given the struc-
 ture of the design capital map, our cases offer mixed evidence
 for them. For example, Softsys 's move 2C unfolded in a way
 that is counter to proposition 2a. Our proposition would have
 predicted the abandonment of the custom extension option by
 Softsys designers, since the firm was resource scarce and
 carrying a high level of debt at the time. But instead, Softsys
 designers accumulated more debt by continuing to develop
 custom extensions. Paradoxically, this locked the firm into a
 virtuous cycle. Rather than being paralyzed by the accumu-
 lated debt, Softsys 's system integration services division
 simply charged its clients to fix the problems that arose.
 Having invested in Softsys enterprise software applications
 and extensively customized the applications to their needs,
 these clients faced high switching costs and were essentially
 locked into the product. Thus, Softsys was perversely incen-
 ti vized to accumulate more debt by creating additional custom
 extension points, since the resulting costs could be transferred
 to its clients. As noted before, this suggests that the ability to
 transfer debt is an important additional contingency to con-
 sider. We do so explicitly in the fourth pair of propositions
 below.
 6Both of these moves involved technological discontinuities (Anderson and
 Tushman 1 990) and user-led innovation (von Hippel and Katz 2002). Softsys
 took advantage of the emergence of a component-based software develop-
 ment paradigm, and Testco embraced the emerging Microsoft .NET platform
 to build a product family architecture. Moreover, both firms had experi-
 mented with user community-generated code and sought ways to control the
 open innovation process. We highlight the need to develop a more nuanced
 understanding of the way these factors influence design moves as an open
 issue for future research.
 More countervailing evidence is offered by Cellsys 2A and
 Infocom 2B, two moves that did not conform to proposition
 2b. Both of these moves created more options instead of
 reducing debt when the respective firms were in a debt-
 constrained state with abundant resources. Cellsys added an
 operator-focused module and Infocom installed an integrated
 CRM database. Through discussions with designers at the
 firms, we learned that they initially responded to business
 pressures to create more functionality, but then quickly
 realized that they could not exploit these options without
 addressing the debt they had created. In fact, both firms
 addressed the high-debt situation in their next moves: Cellsys
 completely refactored its system to separate out retail- and
 operator-specific modules (Cellsys 2B) and Infocom aban-
 doned their ill-conceived account management module that
 allowed overly complex customizations (Infocom 2C).7
 Low-Quality Design Capital
 We next consider low-quality design capital, a state in which
 a firm possesses few design options, and its ability to exercise
 the options it does possess is impeded by high technical debt.
 Although clearly undesirable, this state is not uncommon; two
 of our four case firms experienced it during our observation
 period.
 Once again, resource munificence strongly influences the
 design moves available to a firm in this state. However, when
 designers face both low-quality design capital and a resource-
 scarce environment, their choice of design moves is over-
 constrained. On one hand, they are limited in their ability to
 extract value from their existing design capital, either by
 exercising options that were created in the past or borrowing
 from the future in the form of technical debt. On the other
 hand, without additional resources they cannot invest in
 improving the quality of their designs. Our conceptual model
 offers little guidance in this situation, other than to suggest
 that it is unsustainable; either the product or project needs to
 be "bailed out" (e.g., by investors or other parts of the firm),
 or higher management needs to "pull the plug" on it. Both of
 these outcomes are common in practice, although we only
 observed the former in our study. In the Infocom case, IT
 personnel in each of the firm's three service divisions were
 7These examples of countervailing evidence highlight the potential for the
 coding of design move boundaries ("chunking" of moves) to affect tests of
 our propositions. We adopted a conservative approach, treating the evidence
 as contradictory even though it would have been consistent if we had either
 combined successive moves or relaxed our interpretation of the propositions
 to "look ahead" farther into the future.
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 initially overconstrained by aging legacy systems and lack of
 funding (Infocom 1 A), but were able to exit the low-quality
 state with the aid of fresh resources that became available as
 a result of merging the three divisions into a single new
 operating company.8
 In the absence of resource constraints, designers can exit a
 low-quality design capital state either by reducing debt or
 creating options. At Testco, designers reduced their technical
 debt by completely rewriting a legacy application using a
 newer programming language (T estco 2 A). These efforts also
 succeeded in expanding the option value of the firm's design
 capital. In contrast, Infocom IT personnel created an option
 for tighter integration with a new CRM platform after
 substituting newer billing applications for the existing legacy
 ones (Infocom 2A). Their efforts were aimed primarily at in-
 creasing option value rather than reducing technical debt.
 Although both design moves occurred under conditions of
 resource abundance, the organizations that enacted them dif-
 fered substantially in their level of technical capability. The
 teams at Testco had three times as much software develop-
 ment experience as the teams at Infocom. Moreover, Testco
 had the capability to build its own product components,
 whereas Infocom relied on external vendors for most of its
 product and component design. Thus, Testco designers had
 the know-how to avoid longer-term debt obligations and the
 necessary capabilities to take an aggressive stance toward
 reducing technical debt. In contrast, the inexperienced and
 less technically skilled Infocom IT personnel focused on
 creating options (largely driven by requirements handed to
 them by business unit managers); the importance of limiting
 technical debt to a manageable level became salient only at a
 later stage.
 Based on the above evidence, we propose the following:
 Proposition 3a: Under low-quality design capital and
 resource abundance , a firm 's design moves will tend to
 reduce technical debt if the technical capability of the
 firm is high.
 Proposition 3b: Under low-quality design capital and
 resource abundance, a firm 's design moves will tend to
 create design options if the technical capability of the
 firm is low.
 8The Infocom merger is an example of an organizational design move,
 another topic that warrants further exploration but lies beyond the scope of
 the present paper. See Woodard and West (20 1 1 ) for a discussion of strategic
 design decisions that span the domains of technology and organizations.
 High-Quality Design Capital
 When a firm enjoys high-quality design capital with high
 option value and low technical debt, its design capital can
 confer unfettered competitive advantage. As noted above,
 high-quality design capital enhanced our case firms' ability to
 launch digitally enabled products and services, react to market
 opportunities and competitive threats, and shape their busi-
 ness ecosystems.
 If resources are scarce, however, a firm may need to "draw
 down" the value of its design capital by abandoning options
 or taking on technical debt, resulting in a shift toward either
 to the option-constrained or debt-constrained state. We
 observed that differences in a firm's ability to transfer the
 costs of technical debt to other members of its ecosystem
 (including end users) provided a systematic explanation for
 the differing transitions we observed. Softsys, for example,
 achieved speed in system implementation during the early
 stages of the product life cycle by matching end-user require-
 ments with previous configurations in the firm's knowledge
 repository (Softsys 1C). These configurations were often a
 highly imperfect match, but the costs of further narrowing the
 gap between what a client wanted and what the knowledge
 repository offered was borne by the client rather than the firm.
 When clients further modified the Softsys-recommended con-
 figurations, they typically signed separate maintenance con-
 tracts to cover support for these customizations, which effec-
 tively transferred the future debt obligations to the firm's
 clients.
 In contrast, at a later stage in the Softsys product life cycle
 when the quality of the firm's design capital had improved but
 its designers faced greater resource scarcity, they blocked
 moves that would have incurred debt obligations and chose to
 abandon options instead (Softsys 3C). The firm's environ-
 ment had significantly changed, notably due to fact that
 several of its third-party system integration partners were now
 using the platform architecture it had created. Softsys
 realized that these partners, which included well-known
 global IT service providers, would vigorously resist changes
 that imposed additional costs or undermined their own com-
 plementary development efforts. Softsys therefore found it
 considerably more difficult to transfer its debt obligations to
 other members of its ecosystem. Hence, Softsys designers
 chose to abandon options rather than incur new technical debt,
 instead relying on its partner ecosystem to enhance the option
 value of its platform architecture.
 A similar pattern was seen in the design moves of the other
 firms in our study. Cellsys was able to accumulate technical
 debt (Cellsys IB) and transfer some of it to end users whose
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 data was locked into the Cellsys application. However,
 Testco had to abandon options in situations where it could not
 transfer debt associated with maintaining support for
 incompatible standards implementations (Testco 2B, 3B).
 Based on these observations, we propose:
 Proposition 4a: Under high-quality design capital and
 resource scarcity, a firm's design moves will tend to
 increase technical debt if the firm 's ability to transfer
 technical debt to other members of its ecosystem is high.
 »
 Proposition 4b: Under high-quality design capital and
 resource scarcity , a firm's design moves will tend to
 abandon design options if its ability to transfer technical
 debt to other members of its ecosystem is low.
 What if a firm is fortunate enough to be in a position of high-
 quality design capital and resource abundance? As a mirror
 of the overconstrained situation considered earlier (low-
 quality design capital and resource scarcity), this describes an
 underconstrained situation for designers that favors experi-
 mentation and entrepreneurial actions. Designers in this
 situation have the freedom to explore alternative designs that
 can create enormous value and transform the relationships
 among members of their business ecosystem. Competing
 successfully in such an environment requires effective sense-
 making and the ability to cope with complexity and uncer-
 tainty (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997).
 One observed pattern did not fit neatly into our conceptual
 model: firms with high quality design capital tended to create
 product or service platforms that, in turn, enabled them to
 sustain a state of high-quality design capital. We observed
 two distinct kinds of platform strategies, consistent with the
 typology proposed by Gawer (2009): one focused on internal
 economies of scale and scope, and the other focused on influ-
 encing an external ecosystem. Softsys designers experi-
 mented with different ways to improve client-specific system
 performance by developing different customization mech-
 anisms (Softsys IB), which helped the firm launch and con-
 solidate a new internal business division purely focused on
 system integration services. At a later point of time in the
 product's evolution, Softsys designers created an application
 composer (Softsys 3B), another novel customization mech-
 anism that allowed external partners to create compatible
 applications. Similarly, in the Cellsys case, designers first
 created an internal platform to port applications across the
 different mobile platforms (Cellsys 3A), and later pursued
 external platform development by engaging third-party
 developers through design moves that yielded software devel-
 opment kits and application stores for the Cellsys platform
 (Cellsys 3B and 3C). In the Infocom case, designers in the
 high-quality design capital state chose to focus on a purely
 internal platform to help launch marketing campaigns through
 social media (Infocom 3B).
 The above-mentioned pattern in our case data shows that
 resource abundance coupled with high-quality design capital
 (i.e., low technical debt and high option value) engender
 platform creation, but the way the platforms were created and
 used varied. In the early stages of product development,
 although Softsys and Cellsys possessed high-quality design
 capital, they were smaller players in their respective business
 ecosystems and not in a position to wield control over
 suppliers or customers. They chose to create internal plat-
 forms that eventually helped them develop specialized
 expertise and capabilities to differentiate from competitors
 and increase market share. In contrast, at a later stage in their
 evolution, when both firms had gained a more central
 presence in their ecosystems and had developed mechanisms
 to manage the diversity of business partners, they chose to
 develop external platforms. This case evidence suggests an
 interesting linkage between a firm's ability to appropriate
 value from its platform ecosystem and its decision to focus on
 internal or external platform creation during high-quality
 design capital regimes, which we highlight as an opportunity
 for further study.
 Discussion
 Firms pursuing digital business strategies must manage a
 fundamental tension between the need to support flexible
 adaptation of their products and services to changing market
 conditions, and the need to provide stable value appropriation
 mechanisms to extract economic rents and reinvest them in
 innovative activities. The competitive actions of such firms
 are receiving fresh scrutiny as scholars and practitioners
 increasingly focus their attention on situations in which com-
 panies fuse IT with their products and services for competitive
 advantage (El Sawy et al. 2010; Tanriverdi et al. 2010; Yoo
 et al. 2010). In this research, we developed a conceptual
 framework that emphasizes the strategic importance of the
 cumulative stock of designs owned or controlled by a firm
 (design capital), and the sequence of discrete strategic actions
 that increase, reduce, or modify a firm' s design capital (design
 moves). We conceptualized design capital as a two-
 dimensional construct comprising option value and technical
 debt, and adopted the design move as a unit of analysis to
 explore the duality between design moves and design capital.
 We deployed our conceptual framework to examine four case
 studies and developed a set of propositions on the relationship
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 between design capital states and the subsequent design
 moves. The conceptual framework and the propositions
 developed in the paper can serve as a robust foundation for
 theorizing about the logic of digital business strategy.
 Contributions
 This paper makes several contributions to theory develop-
 ment. We advance the notion that conceptualizations of
 digital business strategy can and should be grounded in the
 strategic role of design. In digital business environments,
 resource allocation decisions about organization design and
 competitive strategy are difficult to separate from decisions
 about product development and broader design decisions, and
 therefore need to be looked at through the "fusion view of IS"
 (El Sawy 2003). In these environments, IT investments are
 enacted through design moves, many of which have the
 structure of real options whose value may be discovered
 through the actions of designers and other environmental
 conditions that unfold over the period of product develop-
 ment. Moreover, resource allocation decisions of digital
 businesses are not taken in isolation, but are driven by the
 collective behavior of the customers, competitors, and
 complementors who interact in a business ecosystem (Iansiti
 and Levien 2004). Hence, examining the resource allocation
 decisions and performance outcomes of IT investments
 without explicitly considering investments in design activities
 will result in a biased valuation of the returns on IT by failing
 to adequately account for the different pathways through
 which firms build and leverage design capital. The con-
 ceptual framework, propositions, and the case illustrations
 presented in this paper go beyond the "alignment view of IT"
 (Henderson and Venkatraman 1 993) and embrace the strategic
 role of design. Thus, this paper takes a step forward in
 answering the call for fresh inquiry into how IT and business
 capabilities are fused together in the case of continually
 adapting modern digital businesses (El Sawy et al. 2010;
 Tanriverdi et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2010).
 At the heart of our conceptual model is a concern shared by
 many strategic frameworks: the fundamental tension between
 the short term and the long term, with uncertainty serving as
 a wedge. A variety of concepts have been offered to address
 this concern, including the exploration-exploitation dichot-
 omy of Levinthal and March (1993), processes of improvi-
 sation and experimentation (Brown and Eisenhardt 1 997), and
 the need for organizational ambidexterity (Raisch et al. 2009).
 The conceptual framework advanced in this study contributes
 to reconciling the tension between the short-term and long-
 term actions of a continuously adapting firm by focusing on
 the generative and path-dependent nature of design evolution.
 Design moves can be viewed as traces of sense-making in
 dynamic and turbulent environments where competitive
 advantages are often short-lived (Brown and Eisenhardt 1 997 ;
 D'Aveni et al. 2010). In this sense, our conceptualization
 highlights ways in which design options and the corre-
 sponding penalties of incurred technical debt can link the
 complexity of an uncertain future with a firm's decision to
 manage its design capital for short- and long-term competitive
 advantage. Digital options are at once a means of preserving
 the opportunity to capitalize on a new technology or practice,
 and of mitigating the risks induced by technological and
 market uncertainty. The concept of technical debt encom-
 passes the locked-in nature of designs, the performance costs
 of inappropriate technology choices, and the corresponding
 opportunity costs of missing disruptive technologies that can
 move a firm to a higher performance plane. Examples from
 our cases include fostering cross-platform economies of scale
 (Cellsys); reusing, recombining, and at times abandoning
 designs (Testco, Infocom); balancing digital services and
 product businesses by investing in design for the scalability
 of services (Softsys); and investing to delay full-scale
 commitment while preserving the ability to act quickly (all
 four cases).
 Finally, we contribute to an emerging body of inter-
 disciplinary literature on modularity and design (e.g., Baldwin
 and Clark 2000; Cai and Sullivan 2006; LaMantia et al. 2008;
 MacCormack et al. 2006), which aims to model and explain
 the strategic consequences of designers' actions. By more
 precisely illustrating how designs are generative and limited
 by technical and organizational realities, we explain how path
 dependence and path creation are both jointly facilitated by
 resource allocation decisions and design artifacts. Product
 development and design decisions need to be examined by
 grounding them in the specific environmental context of firms
 in order to become useful as a tool to understand the logic of
 digital business strategy. Our empirical approach facilitates
 this by using design moves to help assess the broader impli-
 cations of the actions of designers, including architectural and
 strategic impacts. Further, our empirical approach operation-
 alized the design capital staté of a firm using a parsimonious
 and measurable set of variables such as option value and
 technical debt, and demonstrated how to rigorously trace the
 transitions in design capital states of a firm by sequencing
 des gn moves. Thus, this research bridges modularity con-
 cepts in strategy (Baldwin and Clark 2000) and software
 engineering (Brown et al. 2010; Guo and Seaman 2011;
 N groho et al. 2011), and contributes to a broader goal of
 establishing an empirically traceable link between the design
 of digital artifacts, competitive strategies built on these
 designs, and firm-level performance.
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 Implications for Practice
 The significance of our research to practitioners involved in
 digital innovation is exemplified in a recent postmortem
 analysis of the failure of Myspace:
 Part of the reason Myspace struggled to keep up
 with emerging technology companies was its site
 architecture... speed to market was essential.
 Friendster knockoffs were popping up everywhere.
 Myspace's founders [Chris DeWolfe and Tom
 Anderson] decided to »build the site using
 ColdFusion, a simplistic programming language.
 "ColdFusion, even back then, in the engineering
 world, was thought to be a sort of Mickey Mouse
 type of technology," says Ďe Wolfe. "But it was so
 easy to use that we could just crank it out quickly.
 We blew out Friendster. We blew out Tribe.net.
 We blew out everyone." They also created what
 DeWolfe calls "technology debt." By 2005 the site
 had outgrown ColdFusion. At that point it was too
 late to switch over to the open-source-code software
 favored by developers; changing would have
 delayed the site for a year or two just as it was
 exploding in popularity. The easiest move, says
 DeWolfe, was to switch to .NET, a software frame-
 work created by Microsoft. "Using .NET is like
 Fred Flintstone building a database," says David
 Siminoff, whose company owns the dating website
 JDate, which struggled with a similar platform issue
 (Gillette 2011).
 To better inform decision makers faced with situations like
 the one described above, it would be helpful to view the
 decisions made by designers and corporate strategists in a
 holistic manner. This research advances a framework that
 integrates the decision-making perspectives of designers and
 corporate strategists; the impact of discrete actions of
 designers can be measured and traced by corporate strategists
 using the design capital map of our framework (Figure 1) in
 order to make judicious resource allocation decisions. Thus,
 the conceptual framework and empirical approach advanced
 in this study contribute to the development of a theoretically
 sound and practically relevant tool for IT and product
 development governance.
 Future Work
 Designs (as an important form of capital) are at the heart of
 the strategic framework advanced in this study. We acknowl-
 edge that factors affecting designs are located at multiple
 levels of a firm's hierarchical structure (e.g., engineers, pro-
 duct managers, corporate strategists, etc.). Our ability to
 apply the current conceptual framework is limited by the fact
 that the interactions among agents at multiple levels of a
 firm's hierarchy and their individual decision calculus are
 difficult to observe directly. This could be explored in further
 work, and we believe that such exploration would be facili-
 tated by the empirical approach of using design moves as a
 unit of analysis. Shedding light on the interactions between
 agents in the domains of design and strategy might provide a
 behavioral context to the forces that shape the duality between
 design moves and design capital, which might help us
 uncover more nuanced strategic contingencies.
 Due to the limitations of our case sample, we could not com-
 prehensively examine the impact of a few environmental and
 contextual factors we observed in cases that could potentially
 shape the transitions of firms from one design capital state to
 another. For example, we did not have sufficient basis to
 fully analyze the variance between our cases on industry
 clockspeed (Mendelson and Pillai 1998), competition inten-
 sity, and the level of environmental turbulence (D' Aveni et al.
 2010; Pavlou and El Sawy 2006). Expanding the empirical
 analysis to firms in a more diverse set of industry domains
 might help us generalize our propositions and develop a more
 comprehensive contingency framework.
 Several other ways in which the theoretical perspectives
 developed in this paper can be extended by future research
 include (1) classifying the types of design moves and digital
 options in a variety of contexts, systematically modeling their
 economic properties in more formal detail; (2) exploring the
 behavioral propensities of designers and their attitudes and
 beliefs toward technical debt and the corresponding impact on
 the patterns of design moves that they enact; (3) investigating
 IT governance mechanisms that help in making design capital
 parameters such as technical debt visible for upper-echelon
 managers in charge of strategy; and (4) developing a genera-
 lizable process model of value creation and capture in design-
 oriented ecosystems by further investigating design moves
 and ecosystem dynamics such as the actions of competitors,
 complementors, and customers and the influence of their
 activities. We see these as promising directions that can con-
 tribute to a more comprehensive theory of digital business
 strategy grounded in the strategic role of design, and look
 forward to pursuing them in future work.
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 Appendix
 Design Moves and Modular Operators
 We define a design move as a discrete strategic action that changes the structure or function of a digital artifact (product or system). Design
 changes tend to follow patterns because designers tend to face similar problems and solving them in similar ways can afford reuse and reduce
 coordination costs (Alexander et al. 1977; Gamma et al. 1995). Baldwin and Clark (2000) identified six patterns that occur in the design of
 modular systems: splitting, substituting, augmenting, excluding, inverting, and porting.9 Building on Holland ( 1 975), they called these patterns
 modular operators and illustrated their economic properties through an extended case study of the computer industry.
 Although we take a different approach in the main text of the paper, one can in principle characterize a design move in terms of one or more
 modular operators. The operators describe the generic action to be taken (e.g., split a module into submodules) while the context of the move
 provides the arguments (e.g., which module is to be split into how many pieces). Design moves can thus be viewed as modular operators
 instantiated within situational contexts. We demonstrate this approach in Table Al , which shows our enumeration of the Softsys design moves
 using the modular operators.
 While modular operators provide a tantalizingly powerful way to describe complex sequences of design changes, we discovered that it is
 difficult (perhaps even impossible) to uniquely characterize a design move in terms of modular operators - at least without direct evidence of
 the designers' intent. This is because the same design change could be achieved using different but equivalent combinations of modular
 operators. For example, a design change accomplished using the inversion operator can also be achieved using a combination of substitution,
 augmentation, and exclusion.
 While this discovery dampened our hope of connecting our empirical analysis more tightly to Baldwin and Clark's operators, it does not in
 any way affect the validity of our analysis itself. That is, a definitive description of a design move in terms of modular operators is not
 necessary for analyzing whether the design move increases or decreases option value and/or technical debt. This is especially true when
 researchers are able to triangulate data on option value and technical debt from multiple sources of information such as design documents,
 interviews with designers, and source code versioning catalogs. Thus, using design moves as a unit of analysis is empirically sound even in
 the absence of direct observational data on modular operators.
 Design
 Move Coding Using Modular Operators
 1 A INVERT (scattered configuration information) and AUGMENT (configuration scripts) to create configuration
 engine module
 1B SUBSTITUTE (configuration engine) and AUGMENT (configuration database) to add new logging
 functionality to the configuration engine
 1C INVERT (configuration database) to SUBSTITUTE (configuration settings) during new implementation
 2A INVERT (scattered function calls) and AUGMENT (tool set) to add segments to function calls
 2B Allow customers to AUGMENT (customer-written code) to designated exit points to create new functionality
 2C SUBSTITUTE (tool set) to help customers create their own exit points for custom function calls
 3A EXCLUDE (customer-written code and function calls) and PORT (core functional modules) to a component-
 based architecture
 3B AUGMENT (application composer module) to component architecture
 3C Allow partners to AUGMENT (third-party components) to component repository and SUBSTITUTE (original
 9Splitting involves breaking up a system into modules; substituting is exchanging one module design for another; augmenting is the addition of a new module
 to the system; exclusion is the removal of a module from the system; inverting makes visible design information that was formerly hidden (e.g., by creating an
 interface); porting enables a module designed for one system to be used with another.
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